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Does Property Rights Protection Affect Corporate Risk Management Strategy?  
Intra- and Cross-Country Evidence 
 
Abstract 
Recent studies in the law and finance literature have shown that property rights protection is 
central to corporate financing and investment decisions and economic growth at large. We 
extend this literature by examining the effect of property rights security on corporate risk 
management decisions - an important element of a firm’s business strategy. Using a unique 
dataset covering 56,000 Chinese manufacturing firms and employing both institution- and 
firm-level measures of property rights security, we find that secure property rights lead to 
higher corporate demand for property insurance, suggesting that property rights security is an 
important determinant of corporate risk management decisions. The effect of property rights 
protection on insurance consumption is also validated by a cross-country analysis that uses 
data from 93 countries over the period 1995-2008. Our study represents an initial attempt 
towards understanding the importance of property rights protection to corporate risk 
management decisions. 
 
JEL classification: G32, G38, D23 
Keywords: Property Rights Protection; Banking; Risk Management. 
 
 2 
Does Property Rights Protection Affect Corporate Risk Management Strategy?  
Intra- and Cross-Country Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
Property rights are a fundamental concept in the economics and finance literature. As 
Levine (p.61, 2005) points out, “the security of property rights . . . is not a natural occurrence; 
rather it is an outcome of policy choices and social institutions.” Recent studies show that 
good legal environments that provide strong property rights protection and contract 
enforcement reduce cost of capital, enhance corporate governance, firm valuation, 
reinvestment rates, assets allocation, corporate innovation, firm growth and thereby economic 
growth (e.g., Besley, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shileifer and Vishny, 1998, 2002; Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon, 2002; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic, 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cull and Xu, 
2005; Lin, Lin and Song, 2010). Using a unique large corporate property insurance dataset 
covering more than 56,000 manufacturing firms in China and following the framework of 
Cull and Xu (2005) and Levine (2005), we add to this line of research by empirically testing 
the effect of property rights security on corporate risk management – an important element of 
a firm’s overall business strategy (Guay and Kothari, 2003, p.423) but has been generally 
neglected so far in the law and finance literature. Bankruptcy is one of the major risks facing 
businesses and their investors and hence corporate risk management is of paramount 
importance in preventing financial distress and bankruptcy. 
The study also adds to the existing literature of corporate risk management. The extant 
literature strives to explain why managers undertake risk management activities since risk 
management should be irrelevant in a classic Modigliani and Miller (M&M) world without 
market imperfection. In the real world with market imperfections, scholars have identified 
several important determinants of corporate risk management activities such as the expected 
cost of financial distress (e.g. Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985), tax incentives 
(e.g. Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985), underinvestment and predation risk 
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(e.g. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000), and managerial risk aversion (e.g. 
Smith and Stulz, 1985). Our study adds to this strand of literature by showing, for the first 
time, that property rights security is another important determinant of corporate risk 
management decisions.  
Due to scarcity of data on corporate use of insurance, the corporate risk management 
literature normally takes the use of derivatives as a proxy for corporate hedging.
1
 The 
existing corporate risk management literature assumes that firms use derivatives purely for 
hedging purposes (Guay and Kothari, 2003). However, managers may also engage in 
selective hedging or speculation with derivatives though this is rarely successful. Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand (2007) report that investors often are unable to discern the activities of 
frequent speculators based on corporate disclosures. Unlike derivatives, insurance cannot be 
used for speculation and therefore it provides a clean testing ground for the relation between 
property rights security and corporate risk management (Adams, Hardwick and Zou, 2008; 
Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008).. As pointed out by MacMinn and Garven (2000), insurance 
represents a simple and widely used corporate risk management tool and the corporate 
property-casualty insurance premiums typically exceed dividend payments by an order of 
30-40%. In 2004, property-casualty insurance premiums amounted to US$1,395 billion 
globally. Indeed, Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith (1986) conclude that insurance is an 
integral part of corporate financial policies. As such, evidence on the linkage between 
property rights security and corporate insurance is of significant managerial and 
policymaking implications. 
There is a close theoretical linkage between corporate risk management via insurance 
purchases and property rights security. Corporate insurance is a contractual transfer of risks 
                                                        
1 Corporate disclosure requirement has made derivative use data readily available in many countries, whereas 
there is no similar requirement concerning the purchase of insurance. While numerous studies have empirically 
examined the determinants of derivative use, investigations of corporate risk management via insurance 
purchases have been relatively sparse. Only several studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1990; Hoyt and Khang, 
2000; Zou and Adams, 2006; Regan and Hur, 2007; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008) have examined the 
determinants of corporate insurance. These studies typically use a sample of several hundred listed firms and 
invariably focus on firm characteristics in explaining the corporate purchase of insurance. None of them has 
focused on the importance of property rights security. In contrast, our study uses a sample of about 56,000 firms 
and examines the roles of both firm-specific characteristics and external institutional factors (e.g., property 
rights protection, legal and financing environment, economic development) in corporate insurance decisions.  
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where the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured firm losses arising from specified 
accidental events (e.g., a fire). Property rights protection provides firms with the right to own 
assets, to benefit from the income generated from those assets, to dispose the assets, and to 
seek compensation for any damages to such assets caused by third parties. The value of the 
insurance contract thus hinges on the degree of property rights protection afforded by legal 
rules and contract enforcement. Moreover, secure property rights lead to more corporate 
investments and thereby better growth opportunities (Besley, 1995; Cull and Xu, 2005) and 
this further provides a rationale for corporate risk management (e.g., via insurance) in order 
to mitigate the underinvestment problem (Froot et al., 1993). The important linkage between 
property rights security and insurance purchase, however, has rarely been tested, due to the 
paucity of corporate insurance data. Using a country-level dataset, Esho, Kirievsky, Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2004) is the only study that shows a positive relation between a country’s 
protection of property rights and its aggregate property-casualty insurance consumption. Our 
study is the first to examine the relation between variations in property rights security and the 
purchase of insurance at the firm-level. This is important as Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2006) argue that one needs to control for firm-specific characteristics to draw appropriate 
inferences about the relationship between institutions and firm behavior (e.g. risk 
management in our case). 
China represents a unique environment within which to investigate the relation between 
property rights and corporate insurance because of the following salient features. First, 
property insurance is a common and major commercial risk management tool for companies 
in China because of the general lack of risk management expertise among Chinese firms 
and/or the relatively low safety standard.
2
 By purchasing an insurance policy, the insured 
firm not only obtains loss coverage but also the insurer’s services on loss prevention and 
control. According to Swiss Re (2004), property-casualty insurance premiums in China 
amounted to US$16.77 billion in 2004, with roughly 65% derived from corporate purchases.  
                                                        
2 Property insurance covers accidental asset losses and is normally valid for one year and renewable upon 
mutual agreements between the insured and the insurer. The purchase of property insurance in China is 
voluntary (Zou and Adams, 2006). 
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Second, while extant risk management studies typically examine either corporate use of 
derivatives or insurance in managing risks, we recognize that firms may manage overall risks 
in a coordinated way with more than one commercial tool (e.g., both insurance and 
derivatives uses). Failure to take account of the interaction among different risk management 
tools may lead to a biased inference on the effect of using a particular tool (Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001). This possibility, however, is minimized in China because China does not 
have developed financial derivatives markets. Therefore, in this regard, China represents a 
cleaner setting for our investigation. 
Third, more importantly, information on corporate purchase of property insurance is a 
standard expenditure item in the accounting books of China’s manufacturing firms. Such 
information is thus highly reliable and not subject to the biases associated with subjective 
survey data (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Chinese data thus provide a unique 
opportunity to explore the effects of property rights security on corporate risk management 
via insurance use. 
Fourth, China is a large and diverse country with substantial disparity in the levels of 
economic and institutional development (including contract enforcement, investor protection 
and the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system) across different regions (Cull and 
Xu, 2005). Our data show significant variations in the incidence and extent of corporate 
insurance among firms in different regions (see Section 3.2.1 and Table 3 for details). In 
addition, Cull and Xu (2005) argue that one important aspect of property rights is corporate 
ownership. China is rich in various types of corporate ownership (e.g., state, collective, 
private, and foreign ownership). In contrast to the radical corporate ownership privatization in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, China’s reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been 
piecemeal and, as a result, the state still retains controlling interest in many firms, particularly 
in industries of strategic importance (e.g., resources). Another element of the corporate 
reform in China is to allow and to encourage the development of private economy, 
particularly in industries subject to fierce market competition (Cull and Xu, 2005). These 
private firms are truly market-oriented entities responsible for their own performance and 
tend to be more efficient than SOEs. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) report that private firms in 
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China now dominate SOEs both in terms of the contribution to the national economy and 
growth rates. The rich variety of corporate ownership in China thus enables us to examine 
how state-owned and private firms that have different levels of property rights security are 
different in their risk management strategy.
3
 
Finally, corporate risk management theories posit a close linkage between debt financing, 
investment and insurance (Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou, 2011). Insurance as a post-loss 
financing mechanism can help coordinate a firm’s financing and investment decisions 
(Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1987; Froot et al., 1993). For example, the existence of an 
appropriate insurance program can provide cash flow hedging and help minimize the chance 
that investment in positive net-present-value (NPV) projects would have to be forgone or 
scaled down following a major accidental asset loss. Chinese firms (particularly unlisted 
firms) rely heavily on indirect debt financing (e.g., bank loans) as equity and bond issues are 
tightly regulated in China (Zou and Adams, 2008). While the state-dominated banking sector 
directs a disproportionate amount of bank loans to SOEs, Allen et al. (2005) find that bank 
loan also represents an important (and relatively low-cost) source of financing to private 
firms, particularly during the start-up period. They also report that the deals between banks 
and private firms are often of arm’s length (e.g., in terms of collateral requirement). Zou and 
Adams (2008) report that (listed) firms often take out property insurance in order to secure 
bank loans and/or to lower the cost of borrowing in China. Therefore, debt financing and 
property insurance on collateral and other physical assets is likely to be a strategic issue in 
management decision-making for both SOEs and private firms in China.  
                                                        
3 While Zou and Adams (2006; 2008) also examine the corporate purchase of insurance in China, our study 
differs from theirs in three important ways. First, we focus on the effect of property rights security in our paper 
that is not examined in their studies. Second, their studies rely on datasets hand collected from annual reports in 
which the disclosure of insurance information is voluntary. As a result, their studies suffer from a sample 
selectivity bias. In contrast, our study uses a dataset that is sourced from the mandatory regulatory filing to the 
State Statistical Bureau in which insurance spending is a must-to-disclose item. Second, their samples are small 
and only include publicly listed companies (the majority of which are state-controlled and hence their samples 
lack variations in state ownership), whereas our sample comprises a good mix of private firms and (unlisted) 
state-owned firms. Third, about 85% of their sample firms carry property insurance, as opposed to about 40% in 
our sample. Therefore, our sample provides more variations in insurance and ownership and this enables us to 
have a more powerful and comprehensive test of the impacts of ownership – an important measure of property 
rights security – on corporate purchase of insurance.  
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Following the recent literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005; Levine, 
2005) on the role of property rights security on corporate financial decisions, we measure 
property rights security at both the institution- and firm-levels, and by different proxies. 
Levine (2005) summarizes the security of property rights into two important dimensions: 1) 
an active government that enforces property rights, facilitates private contracting, and applies 
laws and rules fairly to everyone; 2) a government that sufficiently constrains itself from 
expropriation. We measure the former dimension by a regional property rights protection 
index developed by the World Bank based on an economy-wide firm-level survey on 
investment climate and competitiveness in China (hereafter as the “World Bank Survey 
2006”). This index measures the likelihood that the (local) legal system will uphold business 
contracts and property rights in business disputes, and is constructed separately for 120 major 
cities in China. Given the unbalanced economic developments across regions in China, this 
index exhibits significant variations across the cities in our sample.
4
 In addition to contract 
enforcement and protection, Levine (2005) further posits that the operation and development 
of financial markets facilitates the investor and creditor protection and therefore directly 
reflects the effectiveness of property rights protection. We thus adopt a NERI (National 
Economic Research Institute of China) provincial banking-sector marketization index 
compiled by Fan et al. (2006) as another proxy.
5
 Where the extent of marketization in the 
banking sector is high, property rights are more likely to be respected and safeguarded. 
Specifically, banks have more incentives to ask for collateral and property insurance to retain 
the value of collateral in granting loans. 
We use a NERI provincial index on reducing non-tax levies and charges (Fan et al., 2006) 
as an inverse proxy for government expropriation risk in China. Non-tax levies and charges 
arbitrarily imposed by various government departments are common ways of government 
expropriation and/or rent-seeking by corrupt officials and can lower the security of property 
                                                        
4 The property rights protection index and other survey indexes are associated with measurable outcomes in 
terms of efficiency of investment flows, firm growth, institutions, corruption, as shown in several recent studies 
(e.g., Johnson et al. 2002; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maskimovic, 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005). 
5 The National Economic Research Institute (affiliated with the China Reform Foundation) compiles the 
authoritative marketization index for China’s 31 provinces and regions every year since 2001 (Fan et al., 2006). 
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rights. In addition, we use the city-level index of bank lending corruption index (World Bank 
Survey 2006) to measure the expropriation risk and rent seeking by corrupt bank officials. 
The index measures the level of expected informal payments firms have to pay in order to 
obtain bank loans. If corruption in the financing environment is pervasive, property rights and 
measures to safeguard property rights (e.g., insurance of collateral in bank loans) could be 
neglected in credit rationing and allocation. Therefore, corruption in lending can be viewed as 
an integral part of property rights measures, which has been shown to be of importance to 
external financing and firm growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic, 2005).  
 Moreover, following Cull and Xu (2005) we measure the security of property rights at 
the firm level as different types of corporate ownership – state-owned vs. private firms.6 
State ownership is particularly prevalent in China while private ownership is playing an 
increasingly important role in the national economy. State ownership is often associated with 
vaguely defined property rights, a greater chance of political intervention, and the pursuit of 
non-economic objectives at the expense of other shareholders and thus implies a low level of 
property rights security. We therefore hypothesize that SOEs that are associated with a lower 
level of property rights security have a lower demand for property insurance, other things 
being equal. In our analysis, private enterprises are treated as the (omitted) benchmark group.  
 Our tests of the relation between property rights security and corporate purchase of 
property insurance suggest that: a) firms located in regions with a higher property rights 
protection index, a lower government expropriation risk, and/or a more market-oriented 
banking sector are more likely to insure their assets and purchase more insurance; b) a higher 
proportion of state and collective (private) ownership tends to be associated with a lower 
(higher) incidence and extent of insurance use; and c) in areas with relatively poor property 
rights protection, corruption in bank lending seems to have a negative effect on corporate 
demand for insurance. Our tests also suggest that the strength of the property rights protection 
afforded by the local legal system seems to have a first-order effect on corporate demand for 
                                                        
6 For convenience of discussion, we broadly term non-state-owned and non-collectively-owned firms as private 
firms hereafter. 
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property insurance, while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property rights 
proxies are conditional on a region’s overall protection of property rights. Our results 
regarding institution-level property rights protection remain robust irrespective of whether we 
include SOEs in the analysis or not.  
To generalize our findings and examine the issue in a broader context, we examine the 
property rights – insurance link in an international context using country-level data from 93 
countries over the period 1995-2008. Our cross-country analysis using aggregate insurance 
spending suggests a strong and positive association between property rights protection and 
the purchase of P/C insurance. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the 
degree of property rights security is an important factor that shapes risk management strategy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the linkage 
between property rights security and corporate risk management via insurance. Section 3 
describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the results from the intra-country analysis. 
Section 5 provides a cross-country analysis of insurance purchase and property rights 
protection, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development: Property Rights Security and Corporate Insurance 
 This section discusses the linkages between property rights security and corporate 
purchase of insurance. Following the reasoning of Cull and Xu (2005) and Levine (2005), we 
focus on the effects of three aspects of property rights: the effectiveness of property rights 
protection system (including the ease and reliability of contract enforcement), expropriation 
risk, and corporate ownership (state vs. private).  
 
Property Rights Protection and Demand for Property Insurance 
A firm is always at risk of not getting the returns from its assets due to the actions by the 
government, its business clients, competitors and other related parties (Claessens and Laeven, 
2003). Strong property rights protection and contract enforcement should boost corporate 
demand for insurance for three reasons. First, strong protection of property rights and 
enforcement of contracts by the legal system, on the one hand, creates incentives for firms to 
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acquire and insure their assets, because the property and the expected cash flows generated in 
using the property are protected (Hussels, Ward and Zurbruegg, 2005). On the other hand, the 
enforcement of property rights imposes more liabilities on firms and thereby motivates them 
to take out insurance as an ex-ante protection against ex-post liabilities.  
Second, a strong system of property rights protection and contract enforcement means 
that creditors (e.g., insurance policyholders) are better protected in the event of a dispute over 
insurance settlement between the insurer and the policyholder and when the insurer is subject 
to liquidation, thereby leading to a higher demand for insurance (Skipper, 1998).
7
 Indeed, 
Esho et al. (2004, p. 266) point out “since insurance involves the legal transfer of risk, the 
value of the contract is dependent upon legal rules and enforcement, the efficiency of conflict 
resolution through the judiciary, and the stability and integrity of the law-making process.” 
They show a positive relation between the protection of property rights and property-casualty 
insurance consumption at the country-level using 44 countries for the period 1984-1998.  
Third, property rights may affect corporate demand for insurance through the effect on 
firms’ growth opportunities. Starting from Besley (1995), a growing body of the literature has 
shown that secure property rights provide more incentives of corporate investment and lead 
to improved growth opportunities. Johnson et al. (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005) report that in 
transition countries, weak property rights discourage corporate reinvestment of earnings even 
when bank loans are available. Using cross-country industry-wide data, Claessens and 
Laeven (2003) further demonstrate that in environments with weak property rights protection, 
firms are less likely to invest in intangible assets such as intellectual property, thereby 
dampening their long-term growth. The above reasoning suggests that secure property rights 
will lead to more growth opportunities. Firms with more growth opportunities tend to be 
more risky (Myers, 1984) and/or have more acute underinvestment problems than firms with 
fewer growth opportunities (Froot et al., 1993). Insurance not only reduces the risk of 
financial distress, but also lowers the incidence of cash flow shortfalls (following a major 
accidental loss) that could trigger a scale-down of attractive investment projects (Froot et al., 
                                                        
7 Given that insurers have a positive probability of insolvency, insurance liabilities can be viewed as analogous 




 Therefore, secure property rights may also lead to a higher corporate demand for 
insurance through the positive effect on firms’ growth opportunities.  
In addition, the operation of financial markets reflects the effectiveness of property rights 
thereby affecting private contracting. Where the degree of marketization of the banking 
sector is high, property rights are more likely to be respected and safeguarded. Specifically, 
in a more competitive and more market-oriented banking sector, banks have stronger 
incentives to allocate credits in an efficient and safe way. Banks are therefore more likely to 
request property insurance to retain the value of collateral in granting loans. Our first 
hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Stronger property rights protection tends to boost corporate demand for 
insurance, other things being equal. 
 
Expropriation Risk and Demand for Property Insurance 
 Government expropriation extracts benefits from owners of property rights and lowers 
the owners’ expected payoffs from owning and using assets. As a result, government 
expropriation may impede normal business operations, hinder private contracting and the 
enforcement of existing contracts, add business uncertainties, and lower the property rights 
security of legitimate owners. In China, government expropriation can be in the form of 
various non-tax levies, charges and fines, which may be imposed arbitrarily by corrupt 
officials (e.g., from tax collection, business license, fire inspection, public utility service, 
food hygiene and environment departments). It is important to note that in China such levies 
and charges apply to firms of all kinds, regardless of ownership. Where the expropriation risk 
is high, business owners may be reluctant to make lumpy capital investments and to insure 
their assets. 
In addition to government expropriation, expropriation risk might come from 
                                                        
8 Mayers and Smith (1987) analyze a special type of underinvestment problem that may arise in highly levered 
firms following a major accidental loss because limited liability gives shareholders a “default put option” to 
walk away from a reinvestment project if they feel that the future cash flow benefits are more likely to accrue to 
debtholders rather than to themselves. The purchase of insurance coverage can also mitigate this sort of 
underinvestment incentive. 
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non-government parties (e.g., corrupt bank loan officials). In China, rent seeking in the 
banking sector may also decrease corporate demand for property insurance. As Beck et al. 
(2006) point out, corruption in bank lending directly affects firms’ financial decisions and 
performance in developing countries like China where stock markets are not well developed 
and a major source of firm finance is bank loan. In economies (like China) where property 
rights protection and the legal system is generally weak, credit allocation might be shaped by 
corruption and political ties (Barth, Lin, Lin and Song, 2009; Li, Meng, Wang Zhou, 2008, 
Xie and Lu, 2005).
9
 Facing corrupt bank loan officers who are interested in rent seeking, 
property rights and mechanisms to safeguard property rights (e.g., the insurance of collateral) 
are likely to be bypassed. With bribery payment to loan officers or political tie to the 
government officials, loan applications may be approved even if the loan collateral is not 
backed by property insurance or without collateral (Li et al., 2008). Therefore, we expect a 
negative impact of expropriation and corruption on corporate insurance purchase. Our second 
hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, the more severe government expropriation is, the less 
the corporate demand for insurance would be. 
 
Corporate Ownership and Demand for Property Insurance 
Cull and Xu (2005) argue that corporate ownership itself is a measure of the security of 
property rights, as it defines the owners of a firm and how their control and cash flow rights 
are safeguarded. Relative to private ownership which is in general clearly specified, state 
ownership tends to be ambiguously defined and is akin to public goods (Sun, Tong and Tong, 
2002). As a result, though assets of SOEs belong to the whole group of people in theory, no 
particular individual has the residual claim rights and so the management and supervision of 
SOEs in practice have to be delegated to bureaucrats who do not necessarily have the 
incentives to maximize shareholders’ wealth. This has three implications for corporate 
                                                        
9 According to a recent survey conducted by People’s Bank of China (the central bank), 81.8% of the 
respondents think that corruption in bank lending is quite common in China (Xie and Lu, 2005). 
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demand for insurance.  
First, since the identity of the owner is vague, the firm that utilizes the stated-owned 
assets may not have strong incentives to purchase insurance, simply because the property 
does not solely belong to the firm or anyone else who would otherwise require the purchase 
of insurance.  
Second, in addition to the expropriation risk (e.g., the aforementioned various non-tax 
levies imposed by the government) that all firms face, SOEs often are directed to pursue 
political/social objectives. For example, the government may directly transfer resources 
among different SOEs for the purposes of cross-subsidizing certain SOEs that the 
government believes deserve help. Occasionally, the government may merge some SOEs with 
other SOEs through administrative commands. This represents an additional property rights 
risk and can lower SOE managers’ incentives to purchase insurance for the assets in the firm.  
Third, the government may offer a helping hand in case that a SOE suffers severe 
uninsured asset losses. Indeed, until recently, SOEs in China are rarely liquidated due to the 
government’s concern over social stability. Such a helping hand may take the form of 
pressuring state-owned banks to provide loan support (known as SOEs’ “soft budget 
constraint” problem) or a direct fiscal bailout in the extreme, though both forms of assistance 
have been significantly reduced since the market-based reform (especially the reform in the 
banking sector in mid-1990s). These potential funding sources represent an alternative loss 
coverage mechanism for SOEs and hence further decrease managerial incentives to insure 




In sum, we argue that state ownership tends to be associated with a lower level of 
property rights security and additional mechanisms of loss coverage. Both tend to decrease 
firms’ demand for insurance. We provide two tests in Section 4.4 in attempt to disentangle the 
two effects and find that insecure property rights associated with state ownership seems to be 
                                                        
10 There is a counter argument. Zou and Adams (2008) contend that in state-owned listed companies, 
politically-connected managers could be motivated to insure firm assets because an uninsured major loss may be 
counted as functional incompetence and/or dereliction of duty and thereby adversely affects their future political 
career prospects. As our sample firms are mainly unlisted firms that are subject to less government monitoring 
compared with listed firms, we think that this argument should be less relevant to our sample. 
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the primary driver of the negative effect of state ownership on insurance demand. We also 
provide robustness checks in Section 4.5 to show that the effects of institution-level property 
rights protection on corporate demand of insurance hold if we limit our analyses to 
privately-controlled firms. We have the following third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Other things being equal, state ownership is likely to be associated with a 
lower demand for property insurance.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. The Sample 
 The dataset used in this study is compiled from three sources: 1) the First Economic 
Census of Enterprises in China (2005); 2) the World Bank Survey on Governance and 
Investment Climate Indexes in 120 Cities in China (2006); 3) the NERI (National Economic 
Research Institute of China) Marketization Indexes. The First Economic Census of 
Enterprises in China was conducted in 2005 by the National Statistical Bureau, covering all 
enterprises in China. This comprehensive survey covered almost all the important aspects of a 
firm’s operation during 2004, such as ownership structure, key financial statement variables, 
including R&D spending, advertising expenses, etc. More importantly, for the purpose of this 
study, the dataset reports firms’ annual spending on property insurance. Such information is 
rarely reported even for listed companies in their annual reports in other countries. Therefore, 
the dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore the effect of property rights security on 
corporate risk management via insurance purchase. In addition, the Census covers enterprises 
of all sizes and enterprises with various types of ownership structure (i.e., state, foreign and 
domestic private ownership). However, one limitation of the dataset is that it only contains 
one-year cross-sectional data. 
 We obtained from the Census database a subset of the manufacturing firms that have 
annual sales over RMB 5 million (approximately US$650,000) – an official size criterion to 
classify enterprises. We focus on relatively large companies as theory predicts that the 
insurance decisions of large companies cannot be satisfactorily explained by risk aversion 
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alone (Mayers and Smith, 1982). The subset of the firms is drawn from 120 major cities in 
China using a stratified random sampling method. Specifically, staff at the State Statistical 
Bureau used a computer program and drew a random sample about 33 percent of all 
manufacturing firms with annual sales over RMB 5 million in each of the 120 cities. The 
actual number of firms entering our regression models is about 56,000 due to missing values 
on some variables and this sample size represents about 25 percent of the universe of 
manufacturing firms with annual sales over RMB 5 million in China in 2004. Tables 1 and 2 
provide brief descriptions and summary statistics of the key variables.  
 Data on property rights protection and other institutional variables (measured in 2004) 
come from two sources: a) the China City Investment and Governance Indexes compiled by 
the World Bank in 2006; and b) the marketization indexes for China’s 31 provinces and 
autonomous regions prepared by the National Economic Research Institute in China (see Fan 
et al., 2006). The World Bank City Governance Indexes were composed based on a World 
Bank mega-scale enterprise survey on business environment, property rights protection and 
local government effectiveness in 120 cities in China in the period 2004-2005. The City 
Governance Indexes contain various sub-indexes on property rights protection, environment 
protection, corruption in lending and investment attractiveness to foreign and private 
investors, etc. Other city-level information (e.g., GDP, population, and unemployment rate) 
are reported as well. Reports on the NERI marketization indexes for China’s 31 provinces 
and autonomous regions have been published since 2001 and are the most authoritative 
evaluation of institutional development and marketization across China. The index ranks each 
province and autonomous region based on an aggregate marketization index covering the 
relation between the government and market, the development of the private economic sector, 
the development of goods and factor markets, the development of market intermediaries and 
legal environment. Sub-indexes on each of the above aspects are also available. These 
indexes have been widely adopted in studies (e.g., Jian and Wong, 2010) on institutional 
development and corporate finance in China. The variable definition and summary statistics 
of the key variables are presented in Tables 1 & 2. The variables are discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
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[Tables 1 & 2 here] 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Measuring the purchase of insurance 
The corporate use of insurance is the dependent variable in our analysis. We use two 
insurance measures. The first is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm purchased 
insurance in 2004 (Insurance Dummy) and 0 otherwise. The second, widely used in the prior 
studies on corporate insurance, is a continuous measure of the extent of insurance use, which 
is defined as the ratio of total insurance spending scaled by the average book value of total 
assets during the year (Insurance).
11
 Overall, more than 43% of the firms reported insurance 
purchase during 2004 and this proportion is lower than the 85% reported in Zou and Adams 
(2006) that use a sample of publicly listed firms in China (Table 2). Such a difference 
suggests that insurance is more popular in listed firms than in unlisted firms, probably 
because the former firms are subject to closer external monitoring by regulators, investors 
and analysts. As Table 3 shows, corporate use of insurance varies across cities. The mean 
proportion of firms purchasing insurance ranges from less than 20% (e.g., 19.9% in Datong) 
to above 60% (e.g., 65.4% in Guiyang). The mean insurance/tangible assets ratio also varies 
across cities, ranging from 0.1% to 1.0% with a sample average about 0.27%, and it is close 
to the mean level of insurance purchased by a sample of Chinese listed firms reported in Zou 
and Adams (2006). However, one should not hasten to conclude that such level of insurance 
use is trivial given that the data presented here are based on insurance premiums rather than 
on coverage. We can divide the median insurance to tangible assets ratio (0.27%) by 0.3% to 
gain a rough idea of the percentage of coverage relative to tangible assets and the proportion 
covered is about 90% of the average book value of tangible assets during the year in firms 
                                                        





 Therefore, it appears that our sample of firms purchased significant 
amounts of property insurance. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
3.2.2. Measuring property rights protection and contract enforcement 
 We include two index variables to measure the degree of property rights protection and 
contract enforcement. The first index (Property Rights Protection) is a city level index that 
measures the likelihood that the legal system will uphold business contracts and property 
rights in business disputes. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a high value indicating better 
property rights protection and contract enforcement. A similar index was used by Cull and 
Xu (2005) in their study of the property rights security on firm reinvestment. The second 
index (Banking Sector Marketization) measures the relative ranking of the financial market 
development across provinces. Specifically, the index captures two aspects of the regional 
credit market: 1) the competitiveness of the banking sector based on the market structure; 2) 
the extent to which the banks employ economic criteria in the credit allocation process. The 
index is obtained from the NERI indexes compiled by Fan et al. (2006). Higher values 
indicate a more market-oriented banking sector. As we discussed earlier, we expect a positive 
linkage between banking sector marketization and the corporate use of insurance. 
 
3.2.3. Measuring expropriation risk 
 We use two expropriation risk proxies. The first one (Reducing Non-tax Levies and 
Charges) is a NERI index obtained from Fan et al. (2006) measuring the provincial business 
environment about the extent of reducing non-tax government levies and charges. Higher 
values indicate less non-tax government levies and charges to the firms. The second proxy 
(Bank Corruption Index) is a city-level index defined as the ratio of (expected) informal 
                                                        
12 Property insurance premiums rates vary according to the nature of the business. 0.3% is roughly the mean of 
the premiums rates charged by the Peoples’ Insurance Company of China (PICC) (a major insurance provider in 
China) on an average industrial business basis. 
 18 
payments made to bank loan officers scaled by the loan size. The index is obtained from the 
World Bank 2006 Survey and varies across the 120 cities with a range from 0 to 28%.  
 
3.2.4. Measuring corporate ownership 
 We use two variables to measure the corporate ownership structure. The first is a dummy 
variable taking one for SOEs (including collectively-owned enterprises that are quasi-SOEs) 
(State Dummy). The second ownership variable measures the proportion of state ownership in 
a firm’s ownership structure (i.e., Percent State Ownership). As Table 2 shows, about 15% of 
sample firms are controlled by the state. These figures confirm the importance of private 
firms in the national economy in China. The benchmark group comprises of private firms. 
 
3.2.5. Firm-level control variables 
In addition to the variables discussed above, we follow prior studies on corporate 
insurance (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1990; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Zou and Adams, 
2006) and include in our regression models a host of firm characteristics that may affect the 
corporate purchase of insurance. 
We first control for the effect of firm size (measured as the natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets) and asset tangibility (defined as the ratio of the book value of fixed 
assets and inventory to the book value of total assets) on corporate purchase of insurance. 
Prior studies generally find small firms, which have limited financial resources and/or lack 
risk management expertise, tend to buy relatively more insurance than large companies. Asset 
tangibility is included to control for the impacts of differences in asset structure, collateral 
and debt capacity on property insurance purchases, and we expect a positive relation between 
asset tangibility and the purchase of insurance.  
As we discussed in Section 3, growth firms tend to have a higher demand for insurance 
in order to reduce firm risk and/or mitigate the underinvestment problem. We use the R&D 
Intensity (R&D spending/total assets) and Advertising Effort (advertising spending/total 
assets) as proxies of growth opportunities and expect that they exhibit a positive relation with 
corporate use of insurance. 
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Quick ratio, defined as (current assets – inventory)/current liabilities, is included to 
control for the effect of liquidity on the purchase of insurance. Financial constraints (denoted 
by a low quick ratio) may limit corporate risk management activities (Haushalter, 2000) or 
induce a firm to purchase property insurance (e.g., on collateral) in order to secure bank loan 
in China.  
While market reforms have significantly weakened firms’ affiliations with the 
government, some firms (particularly SOEs) may be able to obtain subsidies from the 
government in the form of tax rebates and/or direct fiscal assistance. We control for the 
potential effect of subsidies received on corporate purchase of insurance by including a fiscal 
subsidy to sales ratio (Fiscal Subsidy Ratio) in our analysis.   
Tax position: Smith and Stulz (1985), among others, argue that risk management can help 
reduce the expected tax liability in firms with a convex tax schedule. Tax convexity may 
result from progressivity in statutory tax rates (e.g., in the U.S.) and the presence of tax 
preferential items (e.g., investment tax credits and operating losses) (e.g., see Mayers and 
Smith, 1982). China has a flat corporate income tax rate of 33% in our sample period, 
however, tax convexity may arise because the tax code only allows a maximum of five-year 
carry-forwards of operating losses and carry-backs of operating losses are not permitted. 
Additionally, the tax code allows tax exemptions or rebates to certain businesses (e.g., 
foreign-invested firms and government approved high-tech companies) (Zou and Adams, 
2008). We therefore create a Tax Credit Dummy that equals one if the current effective tax 
rate (income tax/taxable income) is less than the standard rate of 33%, suggesting the 
existence of tax credit items. We expect a positive relation between Tax Credit Dummy and 
corporate insurance because insurance coverage can help reduce the chance of reporting a 
loss (following an accidental event) and thereby retain the value of tax credits.  
We also control for the effect of firms’ dependence on external debt financing (Debt 
Dependence). More debt-reliant firms are expected to have more incentives to purchase 
property insurance in order to lower expected costs of financial distress and secure bank loans 
(the major source of corporate financing in China). Following Grullon, Kanatas and Kumar 
(2006), we measure debt finance dependence as industry median leverage ratio, defined as 
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the ratio of total debt to assets. Industry is classified by two-digit industry code in China. 
Using industry-wide leverage instead of firm-specific leverage is desirable is because similar 
firms tend to share commonalities in the factors that affect their capital structure and many 
firms tend to use industry average leverage ratio as a target debt ratio (see Bradley, Jarrell and 
Kim, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Gilson, 1997; Grullon et al., 2006).
13
 However, our 
results regarding property rights security are robust if we use firm-level leverage. 
Industry effects: Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) argue that firms in more 
competitive industries are more likely to hedge their risks than firms in other industries, 
because such firms may be more vulnerable to severe cash shortfalls following (accidental) 
loss events and face the risk of losing their key customers and suppliers. Therefore, the 
impact of product-market competition on corporate insurance purchase is an interesting 
question that, to our knowledge, has not been explicitly tested before. We measure industry 
competition as the natural log of the total number of firms nationwide with the same 
four-digit industry code. We also include the two-digit industry dummies in our regressions to 
control for the differences in loss risk among different industries. 
Finally, firm age (i.e., the number of years since establishment) is included as a further 
control for the effect of differences in growth opportunities and assets structure on insurance 
purchase (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2006). For example, old firms may be more mature and 
may have more assets in place that are at risk than young firms. In addition, mature firms 
typically use more debt than young firms. Therefore, we expect old firms to use more 
property insurance than young firms, other things being equal. 
 
3.2.6. Other institutional control variables 
In addition to firm-level control variables, we also include a bunch of institutional 
variables in our model to minimize the chance of the bias caused by omitted variables. Below 
provides a brief discussion. 
Unemployment Rate: Firms located in a city with a higher crime rate are likely to have a 
                                                        
13 In contrast, the current leverage ratio may merely represent a short-term swing from a firm’s target debt ratio 
and such swing is to be rebalanced by management.  
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higher exposure to asset losses (e.g., due to theft, arson or sabotage) and such firms are 
expected to have a higher demand for property insurance. Given the positive relation between 
unemployment rate and property crime rate (e.g., see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001), we 
use city-level unemployment rate as a proxy for crime rate.  
GDP per Capita: Finally, we include GDP per capita to control for the potential effects of 
differences in economic development and institutions across regions on the corporate 
purchase of insurance. In economically developed areas, firms may have more financial 
resources and higher insurance awareness than firms located in undeveloped areas. We 
therefore expect GDP per Capita to be positively related to the use of property insurance. 
Insurance supply-side factors may affect corporate purchase of insurance. For example, 
one may argue that firms may buy more insurance if insurance price in the region is cheaper. 
This, however, is not a concern in China as the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) tightly regulates property insurance pricing by setting the benchmark premium rates 
for the majority of corporate property insurance products and standardizes insurers’ 
underwriting practices by issuing uniform guidelines on risk rating and applicable classified 
premium rates (e.g., based on the type of business to be covered) (Zou and Adams, 2006). 
The Insurance Law also forbids insurers to realize competitive advantages by giving their 
customers premium rebates. The three dominating insurance groups (i.e., PICC, China Pingan 
Insurance, China Pacific Insurance) also have their branches throughout the country. The 
products provided by each of them are largely homogenous across different parts of the 
countries. This feature of property insurance market in China makes it a cleaner research 
setting in which to test our hypotheses and we therefore believe corporate purchase of 
insurance is unlikely to be driven by regional differences in insurance prices or product 
availability. Furthermore, to the extent that insurance market development correlates with 
economic development, the inclusion of GDP per Capita as a control renders more control  
for the supply effects. 
We checked the correlations between the measures of property rights and 
firm-characteristic variables and found all the correlation coefficients in the models employed 
are below 0.5. We also calculated the variance inflation factor of each independent variable 
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and found no evidence of multicollinearity.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. The Probit model 
We first employ a Probit model to test the effect of property rights security on firms’ 
propensity to take out insurance. We then use a Tobit model to test the effect of property 
rights security on the financial extent of insurance use. As Zou and Adams (2006) point out, 
separate analysis of participation and volume decisions could yield interesting insights into 
those factors that influence the ex ante and ex post managerial insurance decisions.
14
 The 
probability (likelihood) function of purchasing insurance is expressed as follows:  
Pr (Insurance Dummy=1) = f (Property Rights Protection Index, Banking Sector 
Marketization, Reducing Non-tax Levies and Charges, Banking Corruption Index, State 
Ownership, Control Variables) +ε              (1) 
Due to the non-linearity, the magnitude of coefficients in the Probit models cannot be 
directly read like those in the OLS regressions. We report marginal effects evaluated at the 
means of the independent variables from the regressions to facilitate the interpretation of 
results. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the 
expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. We use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level in computing t-values. 
Therefore, we explicitly allow for the cross-sectional correlation caused by city-specific 
factors (e.g., legal environment and area-specific catastrophe risk like flooding). The basic 
empirical results are presented in Table 4.  
 [Table 4 here] 
 
As can be seen from Columns (1) & (2) of Table 4, both the Property Rights Protection 
Index and Banking Sector Marketization index are positively and significantly associated 
with the likelihood of corporate insurance purchase, which is consistent with our hypothesis 
                                                        
14 We also tried a Cragg’s (1971) extension of the Tobit model that allows different parameter values for the 
insurance participation and volume decisions, but the second-stage volume decision failed to converge, 
suggesting that this model is not suitable for use on our dataset.  
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that stronger property rights protection and better contract enforcement provide more 
incentives for firms to insure their assets. The government expropriation risk proxy 
(Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges) also, as expected, has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that firms from regions with lower government non-tax levies and 
charges are more likely to take out property insurance than other firms. Albeit with a negative 
sign, the coefficient of the Bank Corruption Index is not statistically significant. 
The coefficients of the State Dummy and Percent State Ownership are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that SOEs are less likely to purchase insurance than 
private firms. These results thus provide some support for our hypothesis about the effect of 
state ownership on corporate insurance purchase.  
Among the control variables of corporate insurance purchase, the coefficients of Firm 
Size are positive and significant at the 1% across model specifications, suggesting that larger 
firms are more likely to insure their assets than small companies. This finding, albeit contrary 
to theory (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008), is consistent with the results reported in Zou and 
Adams (2006). One explanation is that the firms in our sample are relatively small. Indeed, 
the median natural log of book value of total assets (Firm Size) is 9.372 (which is about RMB 
117.55 million in total assets) compared with the same figure 11.881 (about RMB 1.44 billion 
in total assets) in Zou and Adams (2008) that use a sample of listed firms in China. As 
expected, the coefficients of Debt Finance Dependence and Tangibility are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that firms from finance dependent industries and firms 
have relatively more tangible assets are more likely to take out property insurance.  
Also, as expected, the two proxies for growth opportunities (R&D Intensity and 
Advertising Efforts) are found to have a positive and significant impact on a firm’s propensity 
to purchase insurance. These results are consistent with the argument that firms facing more 
growth opportunities tend to be more risky and/or have higher agency costs of 
underinvestment problems than firms with fewer growth opportunities (Mayers and Smith, 
1987; Froot et al., 1993).  
Quick ratio is found to have a negative significant effect on the incidence of property 
insurance. This is plausible because liquid firms may have less need to use insurance as 
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contingent financing, or alternatively, firms with a low liquidity purchase insurance to 
facilitate obtaining bank loans. 
The other control variables also yield interesting results. Industry Competition is found to 
increase firms’ likelihood of purchasing insurance, suggesting that firms operating in 
industries with fierce market competition have added incentives to insure their assets in order 
to remain competitive and/or keep overall business risks under control. To our knowledge, 
this is the first evidence concerning the direct impact of product-market competition on 
corporate insurance purchase in the literature.  
Finally, older companies are found to be more likely to purchase insurance probably 
because they have more insurable tangible assets in place than younger firms. With respect to 
the macro control variables, Unemployment rate, the proxy variable of crime rate, is as 
expected positively related to firms’ likelihood of purchasing insurance. No other variables 
are found to have material impacts on firms’ propensity to purchase insurance. 
 
4.2. The Tobit model 
The above analyses focus on the impact of property rights security on the incidence of 
insurance. We now turn to the impact of property rights security on the financial extent of 
insurance purchase. Since the dependent variable is left censored at 0, Tobit model is 
employed in the analysis. The Tobit models are estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation. The results are presented in Columns (3) & (4) of Table 4. Again, the coefficient 
estimates of the Tobit models are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at 
the means of the independent variables from the regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy 
variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable 
as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.  
We again use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level in 
computing t-values to allow for the cross-sectional correlation. We winsorize Insurance 
Intensity at the 99% percentile to eliminate extreme values. 
As can be seen from Table 4 and consistent with the findings from the Probit analysis, 
the coefficients of Property Rights Protection Index and Banking Sector Marketization index 
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are positive and significant at the 1% level in all model specifications, suggesting that 
stronger property rights protection, better contract enforcement and a more market-oriented 
banking sector lead to more corporate consumption of property insurance. Again, the 
coefficients of Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that firms from regions with less government expropriation tend to purchase more 
property insurance than do other firms.  
The results on state ownership variables derived from the Tobit estimations are consistent 
with our findings from the Probit analysis. The coefficients of the State Dummy and Percent 
State Ownership are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
SOEs tend to purchase less insurance than private firms.  
The two proxies for growth opportunities (R&D Intensity and Advertising Efforts) are, 
again, found to have a positive and significant influence on the extent of insurance purchased. 
The coefficient of Tangibility is unexpectedly negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that firms do not purchase insurance in amounts proportionate to asset tangibility 
though firms with higher asset tangibility intensity are more likely to purchase insurance in 
the first place. This could arise because property insurance is related to the replacement value 
of assets rather than the book value of assets. Alternatively, the marginal benefit of increasing 
property insurance may be declining once a certain level of coverage is obtained. These 
results on asset tangibility are consistent with the findings of Zou and Adams (2006) in their 
study of insurance purchases by publicly listed Chinese firms.  
Different from our expectation, the coefficients of Firm Size are positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that large sample firms tend to buy more property insurance than small 
firms. As we pointed earlier, one reason may be that our sample firms are relatively small. 
Product market competition is found to have a positive impact on the extent of corporate 
insurance. The coefficient of Debt Finance Dependence is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that firms from finance dependent industries and/or those have a 
higher target debt ratio purchase more insurance than other firms. Finally, older companies 
tend to purchase more insurance than younger firms. Firms from more economically 
developed areas (proxyed by a high GDP per capita) tend to have a lower insurance intensity 
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than other firms. Perhaps firms from more economically developed areas are more capable of 
self insuring some asset-loss risks. No other variables are found to have significant impacts 
on the extent of corporate insurance. 
 
4.3. Further Results from the Split-Sample Analysis 
Our previous results show that property rights protection is associated with a higher 
corporate demand for insurance. We suspect that among our three measures of property rights 
security, the regional property protection index may have a first-order effect. To study 
whether the effect of corporate ownership and government expropriation on corporate 
purchase of insurance is conditional on the overall environment of property rights protection, 
we split the sample into cities with good property rights protection and contract enforcement 
(the cities with Property Rights Protection Index above the sample median) and poor property 
rights protection and contract enforcement (the cities with Property Rights Protection Index 
below the sample median) and repeat the regression analysis in each sub-sample. The 
empirical results are presented in Table 5.  
[Table 5 here] 
 
 There are three interesting findings. First, reducing government expropriation only 
significantly increases corporate demand for insurance when regional protection of property 
rights is strong. Second, in regions with weak property rights protection, the effect of bank 
lending corruption on corporate purchase of property insurance is negative (with the 
coefficient being significant in the Probit model). Therefore, corruption in bank lending 
seems to reduce firms’ likelihood of insurance purchase when local protection of property 
rights is poor. Third, the negative effect of state ownership on corporate purchase of 
insurance is attenuated by the strong property right protection. Indeed, according to Wald 
tests, the difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership between the group with 
strong property right protection and the group with weak property rights protection in the 
Probit model is 0.025 with a p-value of 0.118 (two-tailed). The difference in the coefficient of 
Percent State Ownership between the group with strong property right protection and the 
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group with weak property rights protection in the Tobit model is 0.043, with a p-value of 
0.001 (two-tailed). In other words, in areas where property rights protection is weak, SOEs 
tend to buy less property insurance, other things being equal. These findings suggest that a 
region’s overall protection of property rights seems to have a first-order effect on corporate 
demand for property insurance, while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property 
rights proxies are conditional on a region’s overall protection of property rights. 
In addition, firms from economically more developed areas have a lower demand for 
property insurance only when the region’s property rights protection is weak, further 
highlighting the importance of property rights protection. The other variables have similar 
impacts on corporate purchase of insurance in both samples.  
 
4.4.Disentangle the effect of insecure property rights and access to alternative finance on 
insurance use in SOEs 
 The aforementioned tests reveal a negative relation between the incidence and extent of 
corporate purchase of property insurance and state ownership. We believe that this relation is 
primarily driven by the ambiguity and unsecure property rights in SOEs (we call this the 
property rights story). As discussed in Section 2, one, however, may argue that the negative 
relation may be driven by SOEs’ soft-budget constraints and/or potential funding help offered 
by the government (i.e., the charity hazard) (we broadly call them the “soft-budget constraint 
story”). That is, the potential bailout by the government will decrease SOEs’ demand for 
property insurance. We provide two tests in this section in attempt to disentangle the property 
rights story and the soft-budget constraint story of state ownership. 
Our first test is to interact the State Dummy with Fiscal Subsidy Ratio. If the soft-budget 
constraint story is at work, we expect that SOEs receiving more fiscal subsidies from the 
government may have few incentives to use property insurance. SOEs that are currently 
receiving more fiscal subsidies also may expect to receive government help in case of a major 
uninsured accidental loss (e.g., caused by a fire or a natural disaster). Therefore, a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term would provide some support for 
the soft-budget constraint story. The results from the Probit and Tobit models are reported in 
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Table 6. The coefficient of Fiscal Subsidy Ratio is found to be positive and significant in the 
Probit models, suggesting that in private firms the existence of fiscal subsidies seems to 
complement the use of commercial property insurance. In SOEs, the aggregate effect of 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio is negative, but the negative coefficient of the interaction term State 
Dummy × Fiscal Subsidy Ratio is not statistically significant. Therefore, we find no 
significant support for the soft-budget constraint story. 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Fan et al. (2006) compiled an index on the relation between the government and market 
for each province. The index measures the proportion of resources distributed by the market 
(defined as 1-governement fiscal expenditure/GDP). In a similar vein, we calculate a 
city-level index on market allocation of resources for the year 2004. In regions where 
resources are predominantly allocated by the market (e.g., the coastal East area), the 
soft-budget constraint problem with SOEs should be less severe and so the effect of state 
ownership on insurance purchases is more likely to be driven by the low level of property 
rights security associated with SOEs. Therefore, we expect to find that the market allocation 
index attenuates the negative relation between state ownership and corporate demand of 
insurance if the relation is driven by the soft budget constraints. Table 7 presents the Probit 
and Tobit regression results based on two sub-groups determined by whether the 
market-resource-allocation index is above or below sample median. Strikingly, the 
coefficients of state ownership are always negatively significant at the 0.01 level. We carried 
out a Wald test of the difference in the coefficients of state ownership between the two 
sub-groups in the Probit and Tobit models, respectively. Neither Chi-square statistic is 
statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.799 and 0.686 respectively, d.f.=1). Therefore, we 
find no evidence supporting that the negative effect of state ownership on corporate demand 
for insurance is mainly due to the soft-budget constraints of SOEs. Instead, the property 
rights story of state ownership seems to be at work. 
[Table 7 here] 
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4.5. Results from using only privately-controlled firms 
Unlike SOEs, privately-controlled firms do not face soft-budget constraints and the 
charity hazard that may lower insurance demand. Analysis based on privately-controlled 
firms therefore might provide a sharper and cleaner test of how institution-level property 
rights protection shapes corporate property insurance decisions. Below we repeat our 
analyses in Tables 4 and 5 using only privately-controlled firms (with private ownership over 
50%). The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. It is clear that our major results from using 
only private firms confirm our previous main finding – i.e., weak property rights protection 
discourages firms from engage in risk management activities via insurance. 
 [Table 8 and 9 here] 
 
5. Evidence from a Cross-Country Analysis 
 Thus far, we have provided evidence on the effects of regional property rights protection 
on the corporate purchase of P/C insurance using detailed firm-level insurance data from 
China. One may wonder how generalizable the result is. In this section, we attempt to provide 
additional evidence of property rights protection on the purchase of P/C insurance within an 
international context. Two caveats are in order. First, it is not possible to obtain firm-level 
insurance data within an international context because of firm-level insurance spending is 
only uniquely available from China (see footnote 1 for details). As a result, the analysis must 
be carried out at the country aggregation level instead of firm level. Second, we are unable to 
separate from the aggregate insurance data the portion of corporate purchase of insurance. 
These two caveats mean that the cross-country analysis presented in this section should not 
be construed as a simple extension of our intra-country analysis that is much more detailed. 
Nevertheless, we believe the cross-country validation adds additional rigor to our 
single-country analysis and sheds further insights into the importance of property rights 
protection to the purchase of P/C insurance. Our analysis based on a more complete and more 
recent dataset (93 countries over 1995-2008) also extends Esho et al. (2004). 
 
5.1. Data and Variables 
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 We purchased P/C insurance data from Swiss Re, a leading reinsurance company in the 
world and famous for its authoritative insurance statistics and research for 93 countries for 
the period 1995-2008. As Esho et al. (2004), we measure consumption of P/C insurance as 
Insurance Premium per Capita (measured in US dollars) in corresponding years.
15
 
 In line with our analysis of China, we measure property rights protection with three 
categories of indexes measuring (a) the rule of law, contract enforcement; (b) banking sector 
development and marketization;
16
 and (c) the cleanliness of government is an inverse proxy 
for corruption and expropriation risk. We conducted a comprehensive study and obtained 
several indexes from various authoritative sources.  
For (a), we have two indexes – i.e., the rule-of-law index compiled by the World Bank 
(hereafter as ROL of WB) and the index on legal structure and security of property rights 
compiled by the Economic Freedom Network (hereafter as LSSPR of EFN). Please see Table 
1 for details of variable definition and data source. 
For (b), we have two measures. The first is Bank Credit/GDP, measuring the importance 
of bank-intermediated finance to the national economy
17
. This ratio should have a positive 
effect on P/C insurance consumption if property rights protection and contract enforcement is 
strong. The second is a proxy for the competitiveness of banking business (Bank 
Concentration), which is defined as the proportion of assets owned by the three largest banks 
as a share of assets of all commercial banks in a country. Higher concentration is generally 
linked to a lower level of competition within the banking industry (Barth et al., 2009).  
Banks in such countries may have fewer incentives to request collateral and insurance 
coverage of collateral in lending. Alternatively, corruption in lending may substitute for the 
insurance requirement. We therefore expect Bank Concentration to have a negative effect on 
P/C insurance consumption. These two measures are extracted from the World Bank website. 
For (c), we have the index on control of corruption prepared by the World Bank 
                                                        
15 In unreported results, we also measure P/C insurance consumption as Insurance Premium/GDP, and find 
similar results. 
16 We focus on private debt because the collateral requirement and associated insurance is less common in 
public debt (e.g., bond).  
17 This ratio has been widely used as a measure for financial development (e.g. Beck et al. 2000, Beck and 
Levine, 2002).  
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(hereafter as COC of WB), freedom from corruption prepared by the Heritage Foundation 
(hereafter as FFC of HF).  
 In addition to the above variables, we also include the GDP per Capita (measured in 
thousand US dollars) to control for the effect of income and economic development on the 
purchase of P/C insurance and expect it to have a positive effect. We then match these 
variables with the insurance data. The actual number of observations and countries entering 
the regression varies according to which variables are used. These different numbers of 
observations in different model specifications provide a good opportunity to examine the 
robustness of our results. 
 Table 10 Panel A provides summary statistics of the variables used in the cross-country 
analysis. It is apparent that Insurance Premium per Capita is highly skewed and we therefore 
take natural log and use it in our regression analysis. Panel B presents the correlation 
coefficients of the various proxies for property rights protection, corruption, and credit 
market development. It is also evident that indexes for property rights protection and (anti-) 
corruption measures are highly correlated. In addition, the property rights protection (or 
anti-corruption) measures obtained from different sources are also highly correlated, which 
lends more credence to these indexes as reasonable proxies for a country’s protection of 
property rights. Because of the high correlation coefficients between property rights 
protection and anti-corruption measures, we do not include them simultaneously in the model 
to avoid multicollinearity.    
 [Table 10 here] 
 
 Panel A of Table 11 reports the regression results from using the rule-of-law index 
compiled by the World Bank as the proxy for property rights protection. We report 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level in computing t-values 
to allow for the within-country but between-year correlation. We enter independent variables 
stepwise to show the robustness of our results and for each model specification we report the 
results from the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation and the country fixed-effects panel 
models. We performed a Hausman specification test, which is based on the differences 
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between the coefficients estimated from fixed or random-effects models, to determine which 
kind of panel model – fixed-effects or random-effects – should be used in this study. The 
unreported test rejected the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the unobservable 
country-specific effects and the explanatory variables in the model. In this case, the 
fixed-effects model can derive consistent estimates but the random-effects model cannot; 
therefore, we report the results from fixed-effects estimations.
18
  
 In Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient of the rule-of-law index is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, supporting our hypothesis that stronger property 
rights protection leads to more purchase of P/C insurance. In fact, the rule-of-law index alone 
(and year dummies) helps explain over 60% of the variations in insurance consumption, 
suggesting that potential importance of property rights protection. We then add in the model 
proxies for banking sector development and marketization. Consistent with our expectation, 
the coefficient of Bank Concentration is negative and statistically significant in the 
fixed-effects estimations. Therefore, in countries that lack market competition in the banking 
sector, banks tend to have fewer incentives to request collateral and associated insurance in 
lending. Alternatively, corruption in lending may circumvent the insurance requirement. 
However, the coefficient of Bank Credit/GDP is insignificant, which suggests that insurance 
purchase is not a direct derivative of using bank credit. In Columns (5) and (6), we further 
control for the level of economic development and find the effect of property rights 
protection on P/C insurance consumption is still positive and significant. 
 [Table 11 here] 
 
 In Panel B, we measure property rights protection with the index on legal structure and 
security of property rights compiled by the World Economic Forum. Note that using this 
measure results in a loss of about 500 observations, however, this reduced size of sample 
serves a robustness check of our results. Our results are qualitatively similar. In Panel C and 
D, we use two measures of government cleanliness, respectively, and we find the tenor of our 
main results is unaffected.  
                                                        
18 Nevertheless, random-effects estimations produce similar (and actually stronger) results. 
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6. Conclusion 
Taking advantage of a large and unique firm-level dataset on corporate insurance recently 
available from China, this study empirically tests the effects of property rights security on the 
corporate risk management via insurance use. Following the recent literature (e.g., Cull and 
Xu, 2005; Levine, 2005), we measure property rights security at both the institution- and 
firm-level. We obtain the following results. First, firms located in regions with better property 
rights protection, lower government expropriation risk, and/or a more market-oriented 
banking sector, have more incentives to insure their assets. Second, relative to private 
ownership, state and collective ownership tends to be associated with a lower incidence and 
extent of insurance use. Third, in areas with a lower-than-sample-median index of property 
rights protection, corruption in bank lending seems to have a negative effect on corporate 
demand for insurance, and reducing non-tax levies & charges does not increase corporate 
demand for insurance. Our tests also suggest that the strength of the property rights protection 
afforded by the local legal system has a first-order effect on corporate demand for property 
insurance, while the effects of other institution- and firm-level property rights proxies are 
conditional on a region’s overall protection of property rights. Our results regarding 
institution-level property rights protection remain robust irrespective of whether we include 
SOEs in the analysis or not. The importance of property rights protection is further 
underpinned by our cross-country results from using 93 countries for the period 1995-2008. 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the degree of property rights 
security is an important determinant of corporate insurance decisions.  
Our study represents the first study focusing on the important relation between property 
rights security and corporate risk management. The documented evidence adds to the 
expanding body of research on the importance of property rights and investor protection to 
corporate financial decisions. It also contributes to the limited corporate insurance literature 
by including employment, product-market competition and some institutional variables as 
potential determinants of corporate purchase of insurance. Future study should benefit from 
examining the effect of property rights security and corporate derivative hedging when 
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Dependent variables  
Insurance Dummy 1 = a firm bought property insurance in 2004 
Insurance Intensity (%) Annual spending on property insurance/the average assets value in 2004 
 ×100%, winsorized at the 99th percentile to eliminate extreme values 
Test variables  
Property Rights  
Protection Index  
The city-level index measures the likelihood that a firm’s contractual and  
property rights are protected in business disputes. (Obtained from the  
World Bank Survey 2006) 
Banking Sector 
Marketization  
The index measures the relative ranking of financial market development  
across provinces based on the proportion of deposits attracted by non-state-
owned banks and the proportion of bank loans provided to non-state-owned 
firms. (Obtained from Fan et al. (2006)) 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & 
Charges 
(an inverse proxy for 
expropriation risk) 
The province-level index measures the relative ranking of government  
imposed non-tax levies & charges on local firms. (Obtained from Fan et al.
 (2006)) 
Bank Corruption Index 
(expropriation proxy) 
The city-level index measures the expected informal payments to bank officials as 
a percentage of bank loan obtained. (Obtained from the World Bank Survey 2006)  
State Dummy 1 = a firm is majority State-owned or collectively-owned (with ownership  
more than 50%) and 0 for otherwise 
Percent State Ownership Capital contributed by the state and collective / total registered capital 
Control variables  
Firm Size Defined as the natural log of book value of total assets 
R&D Intensity R&D spending/total assets 
Advertising Effort Advertising expense/total assets 
Tangibility (inventory + net book value of fixed assets)/total assets, winsorized at 1st   
percentile to eliminate extreme values 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio Total subsidies received from local government/sales 
Quick Ratio Ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities (not including inventory),  
winsorized at the 99th percentile to eliminate extreme values 
Tax Credit Dummy Equals 1 if current tax rate (income tax/taxable income)<33%,  
suggesting the existence of preferential tax credit items or tax shields.  
Utilities Firm Dummy Regulated (utilities) firm dummy, 1 = if the firm is an utilities firm. 
Dept Finance Dependence Proxied by industry median leverage ratio (determined by two-digit industry 
code) 
Industry Competition Natural log of the number of firms having the same 4-digit industry 
code nationally (obtained from China’s Market Statistical Yearbook 2005) 
Firm Age The natural log of number of years since business commencement 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate of a city 
GDP per Capita Natural log of Real GDP per capita (RMB) 
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Explanatory variables for cross-country analysis  
ROL of WB Rule-of-law index compiled by World Bank, capturing perceptions of the  
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of  
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property  
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and  
violence. A high value means better property rights protection. 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
ISSPR of EFN Index on legal structure and security of property rights compiled by the  
Economic Freedom Network (see Gwartney et al., 2009). A high value  
means better property rights protection. 
Source: http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html  
COC of WB Index on control of corruption compiled by the World Bank (with a high 
value for low corruption). 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
FFC of HF Index on freedom from corruption compiled by the Heritage Foundation.  
A high value means low corruption. 
Source: http://www.heritage.org/Index/Download.aspx  
Bank Concentration The proportion of total assets owned by the three largest banks to the  
total assets of commercial banks in a country 
Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch  
Bank Credit/GDP Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch 
GDP per Capita GDP/population, GDP is measured in thousand US dollars 
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28  
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Table 2  
Summary statistics of main variables 
Variables Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max N 
Insurance Dummy 0.434  0.000  0.496  0.000  1.000  56723 
Insurance Intensity (%) 0.245  0.000  0.619  0.000  4.297  56723 
Insurance Intensity (%) (insured 
sample) 
0.565 0.267 0.837 0.000 4.297 24631 
Property Rights Protection Index 0.679  0.702  0.172  0.269  0.982  56723 
Banking Sector Marketization  8.027  8.520  1.782  2.670  10.170  56723 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & 
Charges 
10.046  9.960  0.766  5.440  12.000  56723 
Bank Corruption Index 0.056  0.046  0.036  0.000  0.280  56723 
State Dummy 0.146  0.000  0.353  0.000  1.000  56723 
Percent State Ownership 0.146  0.000  0.325  0.000  1.000  56617 
Firm Size 9.596  9.389  1.423  3.555  18.469  56723 
R&D Intensity 0.003  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.905  56723 
Advertising Effort 0.002  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.796  56723 
Tangibility 0.472  0.466 0.216  0.049 0.999  56723 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.003  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.797  56723 
Quick Ratio 1.522  0.801  2.767  0.000  16.333  56723 
Tax Credit Dummy 0.816  1.000  0.388  0.000  1.000  56723 
Utilities Firm Dummy 0.022  0.000  0.147  0.000  1.000  56723 
Debt Finance Dependence 0.592  0.596  0.042  0.434  0.659  56723 
Industrial Competition 6.622  6.663  1.190  0.693  9.097  56723 
Firm Age 1.667  1.609  0.951  0.000  6.001  56723 
Unemployment Rate 3.175  3.500  1.159  0.500  8.500  56723 




Corporate insurance purchase across 120 cities 
City 
Mean proportion 
of firms buying 
insurance (%) 
Mean insurance 
spending to tangible 
assets ratio (%) 
City 




spending to tangible 
assets ratio (%) 
East   Central   
Anshan 37.8 0.3 Anqing 50.4 0.3 
Baoding 36.8 0.3 Changde 35.9 0.2 
Beijing 38.4 0.1 Changchun 38.6 0.3 
Benxi 34.1 0.1 Changsha 44.3 0.5 
Cangzhou 34.8 0.1 Chenzhou 33.3 0.9 
Changzhou 47.5 0.4 Chuzhou 42.4 0.3 
Dalian 46.9 0.2 Daqing 37.9 0.2 
Dongguan 33.6 0.2 Datong 19.9 0.1 
Foshan 39.3 0.4 Ganzhou 41.2 0.4 
Fuzhou 38.7 0.2 Haerbin 32.0 0.1 
Fushun 43.9 0.3 Hefei 47.9 0.2 
Guangzhou 36.8 0.2 Hengyang 41.4 0.3 
Haikou 50.8 0.2 Huanggang 37.9 0.3 
Handan 34.0 0.2 Jilin 42.4 0.5 
Hangzhou 52.9 0.3 Jingmen 35.2 0.3 
Huzhou 59.1 0.4 Jingzhou 42.9 0.2 
Huizhou 40.4 0.4 Jiujiang 32.6 0.2 
Jinan 28.4 0.5 Luoyang 27.7 0.2 
Jining 46.9 0.5 Nanchang 36.3 0.2 
Jiaxing 64.0 0.3 Nanyang 36.2 0.5 
Jiangmen 38.8 0.3 Qiqihaer 38.6 0.2 
Jinhua 49.4 0.4 Shangqiu 29.5 0.1 
Jinzhou 28.3 0.2 Shangrao 31.1 0.2 
Langfang 34.1 0.2 Taiyuan 22.7 0.2 
Lianyungang 40.0 0.2 Wuhu 42.5 0.2 
Linyi 34.4 0.2 Wuhan 42.0 0.4 
Maoming 23.9 0.2 Xiangfan 31.5 0.3 
Nanjing 37.2 0.2 Xiaogan 46.4 0.2 
Nantong 45.8 0.4 Xinxiang 35.2 0.2 
Ningbo 59.0 0.3 Xuchang 37.4 0.6 
Qinhuangdao 43.5 0.2 Yichang 46.6 0.3 
Qingdao 47.1 0.3 Yichun 35.0 0.3 
Quanzhou 41.4 0.4 Yueyang 28.9 0.3 
Sanming 41.7 0.3 Yuncheng 39.6 0.1 
Shantou 31.0 0.2 Zhengzhou 31.2 0.3 
Shanghai 46.7 0.4 Zhoukou 27.7 0.3 
Shaoxing 61.8 0.4 Zhuzhou 34.9 0.3 




of firms buying 
insurance (%) 
Mean insurance 
spending to tangible 
assets ratio (%) 
City 




spending to tangible 
assets ratio (%) 
Shenyang 32.0 0.2 Baotou 40.2 0.2 
Shijiazhuang 34.6 0.4 Baoji 51.9 0.1 
Suzhou 44.2 0.2 Chengdu 39.0 0.3 
Taizhou 41.2 0.3 Deyang 47.2 0.2 
Taian 39.2 0.3 Guilin 38.8 0.2 
Tangshan 36.6 0.3 Guiyang 65.4 0.2 
Tianjin 33.1 0.2 Huhehaote 39.4 0.2 
Weihai 46.2 0.5 Kunming 41.2 0.2 
Weifang 36.4 0.3 Lanzhou 42.9 0.2 
Wenzhou 40.9 0.3 Leshan 45.2 0.2 
Wuxi 40.3 0.3 Liuzhou 43.2 0.2 
Xiamen 46.1 0.2 Mianyang 45.7 0.5 
Xuzhou 32.3 0.3 Nanning 45.8 0.3 
Yantai 36.2 0.3 Qujing 55.9 0.2 
Yancheng 40.2 0.3 Tianshui 36.0 0.1 
Yangzhou 42.7 0.4 Wulumuqi 58.3 0.1 
Zhangzhou 37.6 0.2 Wuzhong 65.7 0.4 
Zhangjiakou 34.2 0.1 Xian 43.4 0.5 
Zhuhai 33.8 0.1 Xining 40.4 0.1 
Zibo 39.3 1.0 Xianyang 55.1 0.2 
   Yibin 60.0 0.4 
   Yinchuan 50.7 0.1 
   Yuxi 62.7 0.2 
   Chongqing 44.3 0.3 



















Table 4: Property rights security and the incidence & extent of insurance purchases 
Dependent variable  Insurance dummy 
 
Insurance to tangible assets 
ratio (%) 
 Probit Probit Tobit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property Rights Protection Index 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 [2.814] [2.816] [3.514] [3.481] 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 [4.279] [4.291] [4.533] [4.586] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 [2.835] [2.871] [3.056] [3.012] 
Bank Corruption Index -0.196 -0.194 0.02 0.02 
 [-0.665] [-0.657] [0.109] [0.108] 
State Dummy -0.052***  -0.043***  
 [-5.740]  [-5.719]  
Percent State Ownership  -0.068***  -0.055*** 
  [-7.693]  [-6.640] 
Firm Size 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 [31.545] [31.702] [9.120] [9.102] 
R&D Intensity 0.438*** 0.433*** 0.287*** 0.281*** 
 [4.056] [3.943] [3.308] [3.185] 
Advertising Effort 1.184*** 1.180*** 1.371*** 1.370*** 
 [3.580] [3.570] [3.748] [3.730] 
Tangibility 0.096*** 0.096*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 [6.925] [6.894] [-11.733] [-11.635] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.127 0.129 -0.027 -0.026 
 [1.100] [1.106] [-0.396] [-0.379] 
Quick Ratio -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [-8.279] [-8.303] [-4.035] [-4.048] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
 [-1.104] [-1.178] [-0.981] [-1.051] 
Debt Finance Dependence 0.905*** 0.891*** 0.486*** 0.476*** 
 [8.366] [8.253] [5.095] [5.021] 
Industrial Competition 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 
 [2.300] [2.364] [2.096] [2.172] 
Firm Age 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 [14.504] [14.964] [12.519] [13.202] 
Unemployment Rate 0.015** 0.015** 0.005 0.005 
 [2.107] [2.186] [0.989] [1.038] 
GDP per Capita -0.018 -0.018 -0.022** -0.021* 
 [-1.100] [-1.090] [-1.972] [-1.950] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.153 0.153 0.016 0.015 
N 56,723 56,617 56,723 56,617 
Marginal effects are reported. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included 
in all models but its coefficient is unreported for brevity. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 
 [3.639] [3.550] [3.556] [3.726] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.014 0.005 
 [2.718] [3.519] [1.390] [0.723] 
Bank Corruption Index 0.088 0.181 -0.694** -0.314 
 [0.195] [0.630] [-2.035] [-1.354] 
Percent State Ownership -0.051*** -0.027** -0.076*** -0.070*** 
 [-3.635] [-2.201] [-7.429] [-7.649] 
Firm Size 0.087*** 0.017*** 0.096*** 0.030*** 
 [23.200] [4.714] [20.903] [9.817] 
R&D Intensity 0.673*** 0.421*** 0.299*** 0.202* 
 [3.699] [2.677] [2.652] [1.933] 
Advertising Effort 1.007** 1.887*** 1.369*** 1.019*** 
 [2.108] [2.743] [3.051] [2.927] 
Tangibility 0.095*** -0.155*** 0.101*** -0.124*** 
 [4.508] [-10.129] [5.380] [-7.534] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.329 0.163 0.017 -0.104 
 [1.473] [1.103] [0.126] [-1.320] 
Quick Ratio -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004** 
 [-6.057] [-2.924] [-5.538] [-2.426] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.023*** -0.018** 0.006 0.004 
 [-2.576] [-2.221] [0.624] [0.363] 
Debt Finance Dependence 0.916*** 0.439*** 0.833*** 0.559*** 
 [7.319] [4.519] [4.103] [3.316] 
Industrial Competition 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 [1.385] [1.269] [1.583] [1.562] 
Firm Age 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 
 [11.777] [10.624] [11.126] [8.276] 
Unemployment Rate 0.022** 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 [2.383] [0.632] [0.495] [0.670] 
GDP per Capita 0.022 0.003 -0.068*** -0.050*** 
 [0.863] [0.196] [-3.481] [-3.809] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.155 0.016 0.159 0.017 
N 28,362 28,362 28,255 28,255 
This table presents probit and tobit regression results based on two sub-groups determined by property 
rights protection. The “strong rights” group comprises observations if the local property rights protection 
index is higher than the sample median and the “weak rights” group includes observations if the local 
property rights protection index is lower than the sample median. Marginal effects are reported. 
Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered 
at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation.  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its coefficient is 
unreported for brevity. A Wald test of the difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership 
between groups (1) and (3) generates a Chi-square of 2.47 (p-value=0.118, d.f.=1, two-tailed). The 
difference in the coefficient of Percent State Ownership between groups (2) and (4) generates a 
Chi-square of 10.75 (p-value=0.001, d.f.=1, two-tailed). Therefore, the negative effect of state 
ownership on corporate purchase of insurance is attenuated by the strong property right protection 
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Table 6 Disentangling the effects of property rights and the charity hazard in SOEs: Interacting State 
Dummy with Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) Tobit (3) Tobit (4) 
Property Rights Protection Index 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 [2.819] [2.820] [3.515] [3.483] 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 [4.284] [4.295] [4.534] [4.586] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 [2.832] [2.869] [3.054] [3.010] 
Bank Corruption Index -0.195 -0.193 0.02 0.021 
 [-0.662] [-0.654] [0.109] [0.109] 
State Dummy -0.050***  -0.043***  
 [-5.510]  [-5.559]  
Percent State Ownership  -0.067***  -0.054*** 
  [-7.614]  [-6.603] 
Firm Size 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 [31.481] [31.668] [9.115] [9.093] 
R&D Intensity 0.435*** 0.429*** 0.286*** 0.280*** 
 [4.028] [3.917] [3.301] [3.174] 
Advertising Effort 1.184*** 1.180*** 1.371*** 1.370*** 
 [3.580] [3.569] [3.748] [3.729] 
Tangibility 0.097*** 0.097*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 [6.979] [6.948] [-11.731] [-11.629] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.327* 0.356* 0.007 0.041 
 [1.661] [1.801] [0.051] [0.324] 
State Dummy × -0.341 -0.383 -0.058 -0.115 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio [-1.360] [-1.547] [-0.345] [-0.706] 
Quick Ratio -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [-8.267] [-8.292] [-4.033] [-4.049] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
 [-1.095] [-1.168] [-0.979] [-1.047] 
Debt Finance Dependence 0.910*** 0.896*** 0.486*** 0.478*** 
 [8.451] [8.333] [5.111] [5.040] 
Industrial Competition 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 
 [2.285] [2.343] [2.098] [2.169] 
Firm Age 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 [14.492] [15.016] [12.510] [13.228] 
Unemployment Rate 0.015** 0.015** 0.005 0.005 
 [2.105] [2.185] [0.988] [1.036] 
GDP per Capita -0.018 -0.018 -0.022** -0.021* 
 [-1.093] [-1.082] [-1.971] [-1.947] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.153 0.153 0.016 0.017 
N 56,723 56,617 56,723 56,617 
This table presents the results from the probit and tobit regressions by adding the interaction term 
between State Dummy and Fiscal Subsidy Ratio. Marginal effects are reported. Reported in parentheses 
are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level to allow 
for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively (two-tailed). A negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term State 
Dummy × Fiscal Subsidy Ratio would provide some support for the soft-budget constraint story, 
however, there is no such evidence found. 
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Table 7 Disentangling the effects of property rights and soft-budget constraints in SOEs: Sub-group 
analysis by the proportion of resources allocated by the market 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property Rights Protection Index 0.106 0.122 0.048 0.121*** 
 [1.555] [1.634] [1.064] [2.804] 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.025** 0.025*** 0.009 0.018*** 
 [2.411] [2.804] [1.368] [4.088] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.033 0.031** 0.045*** 0.018** 
 [1.437] [2.531] [2.788] [2.546] 
Bank Corruption Index -0.199 -0.208 -0.286 0.048 
 [-0.277] [-0.693] [-0.752] [0.227] 
Percent State Ownership -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.054*** -0.056*** 
 [-5.595] [-5.357] [-4.253] [-5.255] 
Firm Size 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 
 [17.023] [31.712] [4.504] [9.095] 
R&D Intensity 0.483*** 0.410*** 0.309*** 0.292*** 
 [3.472] [2.962] [2.715] [2.671] 
Advertising Effort 1.209** 1.191*** 1.735*** 1.085*** 
 [2.241] [2.948] [2.778] [3.041] 
Tangibility 0.103*** 0.093*** -0.155*** -0.123*** 
 [4.849] [5.012] [-9.616] [-7.242] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.15 0.098 -0.086 0.02 
 [1.047] [0.553] [-0.939] [0.196] 
Quick Ratio -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [-4.856] [-6.163] [-2.817] [-2.804] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.009 -0.004 -0.012 0.002 
 [-1.016] [-0.255] [-1.330] [0.146] 
Debt Finance Dependence 0.980*** 0.798*** 0.484*** 0.495*** 
 [6.011] [5.232] [3.181] [4.482] 
Industrial Competition 0.006 0.006* 0.003 0.006** 
 [1.446] [1.795] [0.923] [2.330] 
Firm Age 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.034*** 
 [11.909] [11.321] [9.752] [10.579] 
Unemployment Rate 0.016 0.017** -0.003 0.010** 
 [1.104] [1.981] [-0.353] [1.988] 
GDP per Capita -0.017 -0.027 -0.022 -0.031*** 
 [-0.375] [-1.596] [-0.838] [-2.861] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.151 0.158 0.017 0.016 
N 28,110 28,507 28,110 28,507 
This table presents the results from the probit and tobit regressions based on two sub-groups determined 
by whether a city-level index on the proportion of resources distributed by market (defined as 
1-governement fiscal expenditure/GDP) is above or below the sample median. In regions where the market 
dominates resources allocation, the soft-budget constraint problem with SOEs should be less severe and so 
the effect of state ownership on insurance purchases is more likely to be driven by the low level of 
property rights security associated with SOEs. Marginal effects are reported. Reported in parentheses are 
t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city level to allow for 
cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively 
(two-tailed). We carried out a Wald test of the difference in the coefficients of state ownership between the 
two sub-groups in the Probit and Tobit models, respectively. Neither Chi-square statistic is statistically 
significant (with a p-value of 0.799 and 0.686 respectively, d.f.=1, two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Property rights security and the incidence & extent of insurance purchases (private firms) 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) 
Property Rights Protection Index 0.154*** 0.128*** 
 [2.843] [2.928] 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.030*** 0.018*** 
 [4.555] [4.030] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.031*** 0.026*** 
 [2.607] [2.891] 
Bank Corruption Index 0.017 0.201 
 [0.052] [0.894] 
Firm Size 0.094*** 0.025*** 
 [20.581] [6.247] 
R&D Intensity 0.406*** 0.307*** 
 [2.660] [2.933] 
Advertising Effort 1.463*** 2.126*** 
 [2.913] [3.238] 
Tangibility 0.107*** -0.143*** 
 [5.558] [-8.236] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.115 -0.133 
 [0.441] [-0.687] 
Quick Ratio -0.012*** -0.006*** 
 [-7.235] [-3.482] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.011 0 
 [-1.047] [-0.019] 
Debt Finance Dependence 1.160*** 0.733*** 
 [6.419] [4.076] 
Industrial Competition 0.002 0 
 [0.476] [0.134] 
Firm Age 0.058*** 0.048*** 
 [12.889] [11.492] 
Unemployment Rate 0.014* 0.007 
 [1.918] [1.228] 
GDP per Capita -0.01 -0.018 
 [-0.534] [-1.217] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.147 0.016 
N 26,565 26,565 
Marginal effects are reported. Only privately-controlled firms (in which private ownership>50%) enter 
the regression. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors clustered at the city level to allow for cross-sectional correlation. ***, **, * denotes significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its 
coefficient is unreported for brevity. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Banking Sector Marketization 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 [3.872] [3.060] [3.425] [2.855] 
Reducing Non-tax Levies & Charges 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.002 0.001 
 [3.072] [4.167] [0.214] [0.017] 
Bank Corruption Index 0.265 0.281 -0.624* -0.221 
 [0.554] [0.908] [-1.836] [-0.736] 
Firm Size 0.090*** 0.018*** 0.097*** 0.032*** 
 [12.816] [3.186] [16.976] [6.967] 
R&D Intensity 0.585** 0.298 0.312** 0.317*** 
 [2.195] [1.572] [2.228] [2.863] 
Advertising Effort 1.366* 2.908** 1.674** 1.453** 
 [1.842] [2.459] [2.313] [2.399] 
Tangibility 0.100*** -0.156*** 0.114*** -0.131*** 
 [3.326] [-6.557] [4.527] [-5.420] 
Fiscal Subsidy Ratio 0.305 0.070 0.023 -0.22 
 [0.694] [0.249] [0.069] [-0.829] 
Quick Ratio -0.010*** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.008*** 
 [-4.084] [-1.276] [-6.013] [-3.561] 
Tax Credit Dummy -0.023* -0.009 0.004 0.011 
 [-1.830] [-0.811] [0.305] [0.715] 
Debt Finance Dependence 1.171*** 0.677*** 1.167*** 0.896*** 
 [5.282] [3.589] [4.200] [3.157] 
Industrial Competition 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.647] [0.496] [-0.172] [-0.484] 
Firm Age 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 
 [10.974] [10.504] [8.902] [6.366] 
Unemployment Rate 0.017* 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 [1.905] [0.313] [-0.246] [0.078] 
GDP per Capita 0.013 -0.009 -0.055*** -0.040** 
 [0.511] [-0.441] [-2.857] [-2.366] 
Two-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.161 0.019 0.143 0.015 
N 13,615 13,615 12,950 12,950 
This table presents probit and tobit regression results based on two sub-groups determined by property 
rights protection. Only privately-controlled firms (in which private ownership>50%) enter the 
regression.The “strong rights” group comprises observations if the local property rights protection index 
is higher than the sample median and the “weak rights” group includes observations if the local property 
rights protection index is lower than the sample median. Marginal effects are reported. Reported in 
parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the city 
level to allow for cross-sectional correlation.  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its coefficient is unreported 
for brevity.  
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Table 10  
Panel A: Summary statistics of main variables used in cross-country analysis  
Variables Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max N 
Insurance Premium per Capita 
(unlogged) 336.06 93.60 491.69 0.60 4483.50 1275 
Insurance Premium per Capita 4.588 4.539 1.838 -0.511 8.408 1275 
ROL of WB 0.441 0.474 0.948 -1.717 2.116 1249 
ISSPR of EFN 6.282 6.400 1.782 1.400 9.600 761 
COC of WB 0.476 0.365 1.030 -1.546 2.625 1248 
FFC of HF  51.934 50.000 23.994 4.000 100.000 1201 
Bank Credit/GDP 0.582 0.465 0.463 0.072 3.896 1026 
Bank Concentration 0.639 0.630 0.199 0.148 1.000 1096 
GDP per Capita 13.469 5.915 15.663 0.288 118.04 1249 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Insurance Premium per Capita (1) 1.000 
      ROL of WB (2) 0.820 1.000 
     ISSPR of EFN (3) 0.779 0.914 1.000 
    COC of WB (4) 0.838 0.965 0.906 1.000 
   FFC of HF  (5) 0.750 0.809 0.797 0.827 1.000 
  Bank Credit/GDP (6) 0.072 0.179 0.269 0.223 0.179 1.000 
 Bank Concentration (7) 0.495 0.529 0.495 0.499 0.458 -0.073 1.000 
GDP per Capita (8) 0.777 0.741 0.720 0.753 0.631 0.078 0.590 
 
Panel C: 93 Countries included in the analysis (1995-2008) 
Algeria El Salvador Luxembourg Slovakia 
Angola Estonia Malaysia Slovenia 
Argentina Finland Malta South Africa 
Australia France Mauritius South Korea 
Austria Germany Mexico Spain 
Bahamas Greece Morocco Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Guatemala Namibia Sweden 
Barbados Hong Kong Netherlands Switzerland 
Belgium Hungary New Zealand Taiwan 
Botswana Iceland Nigeria Thailand 
Brazil India Norway Trinidad And Tobago 
Bulgaria Indonesia Oman Tunisia 
Canada Iran Pakistan Turkey 
Chile Ireland Panama Ukraine 
China Israel Peru United Arab Emirates 
Colombia Italy Philippines United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Jamaica Poland United States 
Croatia Japan Portugal Uruguay 
Cyprus Jordan Qatar Venezuela 
Czech Rep. Kenya Romania Vietnam 
Denmark Kuwait Russia Zimbabwe 
Dominican Republic Latvia Saudi Arabia 
 Ecuador Lebanon Serbia & Montenegro 
 Egypt Lithuania Singapore 
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Table 11: Property rights security and the extent of insurance purchases (cross-country analysis) 
(Dependent variable = ln(P/C Insurance Premium per Capita)) 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROL of WB 1.605*** 0.373*** 1.635*** 0.418*** 1.140*** 0.403*** 
 
[15.531] [3.248] [13.183] [3.161] [6.194] [3.166] 
Bank Concentration 
  
-0.573 -0.568** -0.428 -0.566** 
   
[-0.981] [-2.584] [-0.851] [-2.590] 
Bank Credit/GDP 
  
0.118 0.025 -0.206 -0.049 
   
[0.721] [0.176] [-1.009] [-0.356] 
GDP per Capita 
    
0.048*** 0.009** 
     
[4.177] [2.296] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed-effects no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.71 0.632 0.715 0.617 0.758 0.624 
N 1249 1249 985 985 985 985 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ISSPR of EFN 0.813*** 0.070** 0.783*** 0.079** 0.464*** 0.098*** 
 
[11.959] [2.113] [9.807] [2.273] [4.309] [2.844] 
Bank Concentration 
  
-0.429 -0.519** -0.153 -0.515** 
   
[-0.664] [-2.351] [-0.303] [-2.405] 
Bank Credit/GDP 
  
0.337** 0.152 -0.233 -0.009 
   
[2.000] [0.973] [-1.005] [-0.057] 
GDP per Capita 
    
0.062*** 0.012*** 
     
[5.121] [2.787] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed-effects no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.626 0.576 0.641 0.618 0.734 0.630 
N 761 761 676 676 676 676 
 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COC of WB 1.507*** 0.300*** 1.543*** 0.315*** 1.175*** 0.319*** 
 
[15.770] [3.495] [14.228] [2.892] [7.256] [3.012] 
Bank Concentration 
  
-0.937* -0.569*** -0.744* -0.566*** 
   
[-1.900] [-2.719] [-1.694] [-2.732] 
Bank Credit/GDP 
  
0.163 0.118 -0.108 0.031 
   
[0.938] [0.753] [-0.540] [0.212] 
GDP per Capita 
    
0.038*** 0.010** 
     
[3.673] [2.394] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed-effects no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.737 0.632 0.757 0.615 0.782 0.623 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(FFC of HF) 2.545*** 0.105* 2.429*** 0.111** 1.517*** 0.108** 
 
[10.348] [1.830] [9.331] [2.060] [5.545] [2.045] 
Bank Concentration 
  
-0.043 -0.609*** -0.159 -0.603*** 
   
[-0.072] [-2.880] [-0.360] [-2.853] 
Bank Credit/GDP 
  
0.637*** 0.13 -0.112 0.046 
   
[2.897] [0.900] [-0.475] [0.339] 
GDP per Capita 
    
0.068*** 0.009** 
     
[7.010] [2.307] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed-effects no yes no yes no yes 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.591 0.623 0.627 0.619 0.742 0.627 
N 1201 1201 962 962 962 962 
This table presents results from regressing P/C insurance consumption on property rights protection 
proxies. Reported in parentheses are t-values computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level to allow for cross-sectional correlation.  ***, **, * denotes significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The intercept is included in all models but its 
coefficient is unreported for brevity. Ln(FFC of HF) is the natural log of FFC of HF. 
 
